Falsafa, Tajdīd, and the Primacy of the Ethical

Taha Abderrahmane, “Al-Faylasūf Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān: Sīrah Fikriyya | Būdkāst al-Sharq,” Al Sharq Youth, YouTube video, November 20, 2024, youtube.com.

For a complimentary and more academic biographical-intellectual sketch of Taha Abderrahmane’s life, see the introduction in Mohammed Hashas, “1 The Trusteeship Paradigm: The Formation and Reception of a Philosophy,” in Islamic Ethics and the Trusteeship Paradigm (Brill, 2020), 37-61. Aqil Azme’s notes accompanying a translation (in subtitles) of the same interview that is the focus of the present article—published independently after the first draft of this piece was complete—are also insightful. See Aqil Azme, “Taha Abderrahmane: Philosophy, Language, Ethics, and the Renewal of the Islamic Tradition (al-Sharq),” ʿAqil Azme, YouTube video, May 3, 2025, youtube.com.

The kuttāb or maktab is a traditional elementary institution of Islamic learning, primarily dedicated to the memorization and recitation of the Qurʾan. It served as the most widespread form of early education across the Muslim world before the expansion of modern schooling systems. In Morocco, as in North Africa more broadly, kuttāb institutions functioned as community-based alternatives to French colonial education, helping preserve Arabic literacy and Islamic knowledge despite the pressures of colonial assimilationist policies.

The Naksa (setback) of 1967 marked a pivotal rupture in modern Arab intellectual history. The rapid and demoralizing loss to Israel in the Six-Day War, including the occupation of Jerusalem, led to widespread disillusionment with Arab nationalism and prompted a wave of introspective critique among Muslim and Arab intellectuals. Many came to see the defeat not merely as military, but as civilizational and epistemological. For a detailed survey of the post-1967 Arab intellectual landscape, see Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History (Pluto Press, 2004).

Taha Abderrahmane studied at the Sorbonne between 1967 to 1972, where he completed a Diplôme d'études supérieures (a postgraduate degree roughly equivalent to a Master’s) in philosophy and a Doctorat de Troisième Cycle (a research doctorate similar to a PhD at the time) in 1972, focusing on the influence of language on philosophy. In 1985, he was awarded the Doctorat d'État (a higher doctorate required for full professorships in France) for his dissertation on the logic of argumentative and natural reasonings.

The idea that medieval Muslim philosophy was derivative of Greek thought is not without precedent. It has also been cogently argued, however, that this view underestimates the internal debates, methodological shifts, and doctrinal innovations present in the works of thinkers such as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, or Suhrawardī. Scholars have shown that many of these figures sought to Islamize Greek concepts in creative and rigorous ways, giving rise to a distinctly Islamic philosophical tradition rather than simply reproducing Hellenism. See, for instance, Peter Adamson, Philosophy in the Islamic World (Oxford University Press, 2016).

On the history and critique of Aristotelian logic in Islamic thought, see Khaled El-Rouayheb, Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900–1900 (Brill, 2010). For an account of al-Ghazālī’s work on logic, see Azmi T. al-Sayyed Ahmad, “Al-Ghazali’s Views on Logic,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, 1981), era.ed.ac.uk.

The statement that al-Ghazālī “entered the womb of the philosophers, then intended to leave but was unable,” is widely attributed to Abu Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 543/1148), but I could find no source validating the attribution. Ibn Taymiyya is the only classical source that relates the statement but without attribution to anyone in particular. See Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad, 37 vols. (Majmaʿ Malik Fahd, 1425/2004), 13:238.

For a different account of al-Ghazālī’s relation to Greek thought, see Ebrahim Moosa, Ghazali and the Poetics of Imagination (University of North Carolina Press, 2005). Moosa argues that al-Ghazālī did not adopt Aristotelian logic uncritically but strategically reappropriated it within an Islamic epistemological framework.

The four cardinal virtues—wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice—originate in the works of Plato (especially The Republic) and Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics) and are later integrated into Islamic ethical discourse by Miskawayh, al-Ghazālī, and Ibn Rushd. For background on the transmission and adaptation of Greek ethics in Islamic thought, see Part Three (“Philosophical Ethics”) of Majid Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam (Brill, 1991).

Related in Musnad Aḥmad, no. 8710 and others, with a chain adjudged weak by most hadith authorities. The complete narration is: “Renew your faith.” It was asked, “O Messenger of Allah, how do we renew our faith?” He replied, “Increase your saying: Lā ilāha illā Allāh.”

Fī uṣūl al-ḥiwār wa-tajdīd ʿīlm al-kalām [On the Fundamentals of Dialogue and Renovation of Islamic Theology] (Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 1987).

The observation that philosophical ideas shift across cultural-linguistic contexts resonates with broader trends in the philosophy of language and translation. Wilhelm von Humboldt and later thinkers like Charles Taylor have argued that each language embodies a distinct worldview, shaping what can be thought and said. This insight also parallels work in comparative philosophy and translation theory, which challenges the assumption that philosophical categories are universally translatable. For a detailed but accessible account, see Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Harvard University Press, 1985), especially section III.

Fiqh al-falsafa, 1: al-falsafa wa-l-tarjama [The Essence of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Philosophy and Translation] (Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 1996).

The concept of sophia in pre-Socratic thought primarily referred to practical and technical knowledge or excellence, often associated with craftsmanship, political prudence, or poetic insight. It was linked to the ability to master a particular skill or art, such as that of artisans or statesmen, and also had religious connotations as a divine gift of insight. For a good account of pre-philosophical and philosophical usages of sophia, see David Wolfsdorf, “‘Sophia’ and ‘Episteme’ in the Archaic and Classical Periods,” in Nicholas D. Smith (ed.), Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy (Bloomsbury, 2024), 11-15.